Inside the Constitutional Court Today: What Madhuku Argued in the First CAA 3 Case as Judges Prepare to Make Their Decision Public: Seven judges, Five constitutional challenges. Who holds the ultimate power?

Dr P Zamchiya
Last week, following the SAPES Policy Dialogue, I advanced eight arguments explaining why Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Court must invalidate Constitutional Amendment No. 3 (CAA 3).
Today, 18 November 2026, the Court heard the first of five challenges in Harare. Judgment was reserved.
But what unfolded inside the courtroom earlier this morning? Four issues dominated the first hearing. Could Parliament introduce ten new constitutional provisions without public consultation? Did an earlier Constitutional Court judgment permit this? Could extending presidential tenure be disguised as merely overriding, rather than amending, a term limit? And, most consequentially, should the entire CAA 3 fall, or only the ten disputed provisions?
Seated on the bench were Justices Elizabeth Gwaunza, George Chiweshe, Ben Hlatshwayo, Bharat Patel, Rita Makarau, Susan Mavangira and Antonia Guvava.
The proceedings opened with a significant development. Government lawyers did not contest the legal standing (locus standi) of Vrante Mahlupeko, of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA).
Represented by Professor Lovemore Madhuku, Mahlupeko seeks to invalidate the entire CAA 3, arguing that Parliament introduced ten constitutional provisions absent from the original gazetted Bill, contrary to section 328(3)–(4).
Reader, Zimbabweans were consulted on one set of proposals, only for Parliament allegedly to introduce another ten provisions without public scrutiny.
Section 3(2)(f), among Zimbabwe’s founding values and principles, recognises that governing authority derives from the people.
For a student of constitutional law and politics, the question goes beyond procedure. Who controls Zimbabwe’s constitutional destiny? The people or their rulers?
The Government argued that Parliament could amend a Constitutional Bill without restarting the 90-day publication and consultation process.
Madhuku challenged this defence. The dispute was not about Parliament’s power to amend a Bill, but its authority to introduce entirely new constitutional provisions never published for public scrutiny.
Section 328(3) requires the precise terms of a Constitutional Bill to be published at least 90 days before its introduction in Parliament. But what protection does this offer if Parliament can subsequently introduce provisions the public has never seen?
Madhuku warned of the consequences. Parliament could publish one set of proposals, enact another and still claim constitutional compliance.
Reader, imagine waking up to discover that your Constitution has been fundamentally rewritten without your knowledge or consent. That was the danger Madhuku placed before the judges.
The Government, however, turned to an earlier Constitutional Court judgment. In Mushoriwa and Others v Parliament of Zimbabwe and Another, CCZ 04/23, concerning Constitutional Amendment No. 2 of 2021, the Court held that Parliament could introduce substantive amendments without automatically restarting the 90-day publication period.
Madhuku challenged this interpretation. The power to amend a published Bill, he argued, cannot become an unlimited licence to introduce entirely new constitutional provisions never presented to the people.
Reader, this brings us back to my second argument last week. Delegated power cannot override sovereign power. Sections 88 and 117 establish the authority of the President and Parliament, but their powers ultimately derive from the people.
Parliament cannot invoke authority entrusted to it by the people to circumvent the constitutional protections of their sovereignty.
The arguments then turned to presidential tenure. Can the Government extend the President’s term from five to seven years while insisting that it has not changed a constitutional term limit?
The Government argued that section 95 had been overridden, not amended. Madhuku disagreed, citing Mupungu v Minister of Justice, CCZ 07/21 (2021).
Although that case concerned extending judges’ retirement age from 70 to 75, the Court expressly identified the President’s five-year term under section 95(2) as a constitutional term limit.
Madhuku also invoked Gonese v President of the Senate, CCZ 02/23 (2023), in which the Court upheld the binding force of its earlier order concerning Constitutional Amendment No. 1.
Reader, the Government says it has merely overridden a provision. Madhuku says no, no, no. It has changed a presidential term limit. And the judges themselves have previously recognised that limit. How will they reconcile their earlier interpretation with the case now before them without compromising the credibility of the bench?
Can calling a constitutional change by another name alter what it actually does?
Perhaps the most consequential argument concerned the fate of CAA 3. Should the judges strike down only the ten disputed provisions or invalidate the entire Act?
Madhuku was unequivocal. The entire Act must fall, he argued, because the constitutional violation affected the legislative process itself. Section 117(2) requires Parliament to amend the Constitution in accordance with section 328. Parliamentary approval cannot cure a constitutionally defective process.
He also rejected the suggestion that section 175 allowed the Court to remove the ten offending provisions while saving the rest. In his view, the defect went to the very foundation of the Act.
Reader, can a law born of an unconstitutional process be made lawful simply by cutting out ten offending provisions? That was the dilemma Madhuku placed before the seven judges.
The arguments have been heard. At the heart of this historic dispute lies an important national issue. Who has the authority to reorder Zimbabwe’s Constitution? The people, or those temporarily elected to govern them?
We, the people, now await the judges to make their decision public, and the bigger politics that will follow!








